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Abstract 
The basic minimal structures required for a country to lay claims to the practice of federalism include a political 
system in which there is power sharing under a written constitution with a government consisting of at least two 
orders: a central or federal government and the governments of the constituent units. Each order of government 
receives an allocation of financial resources tailored to their specific requirements. Nigeria has been a federal 
state since 1954, yet even this basic requirement of federalism has not been attained in the Nigerian federalism. 
This paper discusses the attributes of federalism and the practice of federalism in Nigeria in comparison with the 
practice in other federal states. It is observed that there are a lot of issues in the practice of federalism in Nigeria, 
which make the practice far removed from the practice of true federalism. Constitutional amendment as the need 
arises is part of the typical dynamism of constitutional order to meet the aspirations of a federation. Nigeria is 
presently going through a constitutional amendment process, which it is hoped will deal with some of the issues 
in the structure of the Nigerian federalism.  
 
1. Introduction 
Federalism is a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central 
governing authority and constituent political units.1 Such power may be shared in various ways; sometimes with 
a stronger centre, or with a weaker centre often referred to as confederation. Generally a federation is born by the 
coming together of otherwise independent states to form a central government to whom certain powers are given, 
while the states retain most of their powers. The coming together could be as a result of the need for defence and 
desire for independence from foreign powers, hope for economic advantage, some measure of political 
association between the various federating units prior to the creation of the union, geographical neighbourhood, 
and similarity of political institutions. Thus according to Lord Haldene, in Attorney General for Commonwealth 
of Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refinery Co. 2  “…The natural and literal interpretation of the word federal 
confines its appellation to cases in which states, while agreeing on a measure of delegation of powers to a 
common government, yet in the main continue to preserve their original constitution …“  
However, scholars are not agreed on the definition or description of federalism, and it is a fact that one 
does not decide on the merit of federalism by an examination of federalism in the abstract but rather on its actual 
meaning for particular societies. Thus William Livingstone stated that the essence of federalism lies not in the 
constitution or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the 
federal qualities of the societies are articulated and protected. Since the essence of government is to promote the 
happiness, peace and security of the citizens, federalism provides a sound governmental structure for the 
resolution of the citizens’ problems.  
Basically it refers to a division of jurisdiction and authority between at least two levels of government. 
According to Wheare (the father of federalism) – federalism is an association of states which has been formed 
for a certain common purpose, but the member states reserve a large measure of their original independence. It is 
a written constitutional mechanism through which governmental powers, functions and procedures are 
distributed among the national, state and local governments (3 tiers of governments) or constituent units, 
ensuring in the process the independence and exclusively defined area of responsibilities for each tier of 
government.3 While Nwabueze4 defines it as  
an arrangement whereby the powers within a of government within a country are shared 
between a national, country-wide government, and a number of regionalized (that is 
territorially localised) governments in such a way that each exists as a government  separately 
and independently from the others, operating directly on the persons and property within its 
territorial area, with a will of its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs, and 
with an authority in some matters exclusive of all the others. 
                                                 
1
  http://www.wordnik.com/words/federalism - 6/6/2015 
2
 1914 AC 237 at 252 
3
 Obi S Ogene, Fashioning the Constitution of a Federal Democratic System – Comparative Analyses of Nigeria, 
Australia, Canada & USA Representative System, Enugu: CIDJAP Press (2001), p. 25  
4
 BO Nwabueze, Federalism in Nigeria under the Presidential Constitution, London: Sweet and Maxwell (1983) p. 1 
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However the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Amache,1 was of the 
opinion that the definitions, meanings, concepts or constituents of federalism must be related to the manner in 
which it is adopted in any government constitution. They stated; “There is however no universal agreement as to 
what is federalism. A Federal Government would mean what the constitution says it means and this must be 
procured within the four walls of the constitution only. Although the word federalism may be knot in the theory 
of political science, it conveys different meanings in different constitutions as the constitutional arrangement 
shows in the legislative unit.” Much as this position may be true with regards to the practice of federalism, there 
are still some basic features which must be found in every federal system. 
In most instances of federalism there is a single national government – federal government, which 
exercises its particular powers across the whole country. In addition there are multiple regional governments, 
often referred to as “provincial” or ‘state’ governments, which exercise their powers within their particular 
regional territory. Each level of government usually has its own particular jurisdiction, i.e. areas of public policy 
in which it and only it, may exercise authority or have the final authority.  The federal government will normally 
have the final authority over national issues such as defense, foreign policy, treaty making etc. the regional 
government will have power over more regional issues, such as establishing local governments; issuing licences 
(driver, hunting marriage etc.);  providing for public health and safety; primary education; agriculture etc.  
The Nigerian Constitution2 provides that Nigeria shall be a federation consisting of states and a federal 
capital territory. Section 3(1)3 further provides that there shall be thirty-six states in Nigeria and went on to list 
the thirty six states. The Constitution also provides4 that Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign 
state to be known by the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This provision is to the effect that the federal 
state with its entire territory is one and indivisible, and its people form one, indivisible nation. The territorial 
divisions, known as states exist for the purpose of delimiting the areas within which each regional government is 
to exercise the powers assigned to it. But their existence does not imply that power is shared between them as 
geographical divisions with distinct legal identity on the one hand, and the federation on the other, or between 
their different peoples and the nation. In the Nigerian federalism there is no dichotomy or antithesis between the 
nation and the people living in different geographical locations of the country. The Supreme Court of the United 
States underscored the point when it said that “the people of the United States are an integral, not a composite 
mass, and their unity and identity, in this view of the subject, are not affected by their segregation by state lines 
for the purposes of state government and local administration”.5 
In a federation the federal and regional governments both derive their powers directly from the 
Constitution and are therefore independent of each other. They must therefore each work within the area of 
competence assigned to them by the Constitution. As stated by Nwabueze:6 “Within the area of competence 
assigned to it (the federal government) by the Constitution, it has independent and direct authority over the 
territory, the people and property in each region; it is as such a part of the government of the people, and so 
entitled to their allegiance.” The relatively smaller size of a region the language, cultural and other peculiarities 
create an impression that the authority of the regional government over its region is superior to that which can be 
exercised by the federal government over the same region. In other words the authority of the regional 
government over the territory and people within its jurisdictional boundaries is not in any way superior to or 
exclusive to that of the federal government. Given the equal right of both, within their respective spheres of 
competence, to exercise governmental authority over the property, people and territory in the component 
geographical units of the federal state and to claim the allegiance of the people, there can be no question of a 
regional government having the right to interfere with the presence of the federal government in the region as by 
taking over any of its undertakings, assets or by ousting it completely therefrom.7 The Nigerian Constitution 
specifically prohibits any encroachment by regional governments upon the federal government sphere of power 
by providing in section 5(3) that: 
The executive powers vested in a state under subsection (2) of this section shall be so exercised 
as not to- 
(a) impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive powers of the Federation; 
 (b) endanger any asset or investment of the Government of the Federation in that State; 
or 
                                                 
1
 [2004] 14 WRN, 1 
2
   S 2(2) 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended in 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the   1999 
Constitution  
3
   1999 Constitution  
4
   Section 2(1) 1999 Constitution  
5
   White v. Hart., 13 Wall 646 (1812) at p. 650 
6
  BO Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria, London: C Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.  
   ( 1982) p. 38 
7
  Nwabueze, op. cit., p. 38 
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 (c) endanger the continuance of a federal government in Nigeria. 
 
In a federal arrangement the Constitution makes a clear or formal legislative division of the powers of the 
respective governments. This feature is so fundamental and so is considered as the take off point or the platform 
on which federalism in a country is predicated. Thus according to Wheare 1  “I have put forward 
uncompromisingly a criterion of federal government the delimited and co-ordinate division of governmental 
functions – and I have implied that the extent to which any system of government does not conform to this 
criterion, it has no claim to call itself federal.” The levels of government in a federal system must therefore be 
completely separate and independent. This separate and independent levels of government is a key feature of 
federalism and forms the platform on which other features may stand. Some of these features which we believe, 
need restructuring to attain a better federal system for Nigeria will be discussed.  
 
2. A Written Constitution 
The federal relationship must be established or confirmed through a perpetual covenant of union, usually 
embodied in a written Constitution that outlines the terms by which power is divided or shared. These 
Constitutions are distinctive in being not simply compacts between ruler and ruled but involving the people, the 
general government and the states constituting the federal union. 
The Constitution provides for the horizontal and vertical sharing of powers, and defines and specifies the 
allotment of powers to the various levels or tiers of government. In the words of EA  Odike; “The true mark of 
federalism is that it distributes legislative, judicial and executive power between the federal and the constituent 
states in a written document called the Constitution.”2 
To ensure the autonomy of each government a written constitution is indispensable to the existence of 
the federalism, for knowledge of its powers by the tiers or levels of government is fundamental in any federal 
structure. In support of this Wheare3 argued that: 
… since federal government involves a division of functions and since the states forming the 
federation are anxious that they should not surrender more power than they know, it is 
essential for a federal system of government that there by a written constitution embodying the 
division of powers, and binding all governmental authorities throughout the federation. From 
it, all state and federal authorities derive their powers and any actions they perform contrary 
are invalid…. 
 
Through the authority of a written constitution the different tiers and levels of government as well as the 
different federating units know their extent of authority and jurisdiction and thus avoid encroachment into the 
areas of others as well as have the basis for defending their actions. In the same vein the different levels and tiers 
of government etc. are able to challenge encroachment on its own powers.  This is made possible by a provision 
by the Constitution of a supreme arbitration body empowered to resolve disputes and rule on litigious cases 
involving governments’ constitutional powers. 
 
3. Autonomy of each Government 
The autonomy of each government, which necessarily presupposes its separate existence and its independence 
from the control of other government, is essential to the federal government. The autonomy of each government 
requires not just the legal and physical existence of an apparatus of government – a legislative assembly, 
governor, courts, ministries and departments etc. Autonomy of the state governments is the defining principle of 
true federalism, its foundation or bedrock as Hon Justice Kayode Eso, formerly of the Supreme Court has aptly 
described in Attorney General of Ogun State and Ors v. Attorney General of the Federation & Ors4. The 
autonomy of the states demands that the federal government should not only keep within the limits of the powers 
assigned to it by the Constitution (ultra vires doctrine) but also that the exercise of such powers as limited should 
not in its practical effect impede, frustrate, stultify or otherwise unduly interfere with the state governments’ 
management of their affairs or their meaningful functioning as a government, e.g. the management of their 
finances, the appointment and control of their staff, the award of contracts for the provision of services and other 
projects, the exercise of other essential governmental functions, like that of law-making or the execution of laws 
so made – the principle of non-interference with the autonomy of the states, as it is called. Separateness need not 
                                                 
1
   Referred to in Hearts GA Ofoeze, Federalism: A Comparative Perspective. Enugu: John Jacobs Classic Publishers Ltd. 
(1999) p. 6 
2
  EA Odike “Nigeria’s Federalism: Myth or Reality “ Abakaliki Bar Journal. May 2005, pp 83 - 84 
3
   Quoted by LO Dare “Perspectives on Federalism” in AB Akinyemi et al (eds) Readings on Federalism . Lagos, Nigeria: 
Institute of International Affairs, (1970) p. 12 
4
   (1982) 3 NCLR 583 
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extend to the entire governmental machinery; certain agencies may be common, for example, the police and the 
courts. But more than the separate existence of an apparatus of government, separateness also requires that each 
government must exist, not as an appendage of another government, but as an autonomous entity in the sense of 
being able to exercise its own will in the conduct of its affairs, free from direction by another government. An 
arrangement which legally obliges one government to accept direction from another on the conduct of its affairs 
is not federalism in the true sense of the word. In a federal state, the power sharing arrangement should not place 
such a preponderance of power in the hands of either the national or the regional government as to make it so 
powerful that it is able to bend the will of the other to its own. The sharing should be so weighted as to maintain 
a fair balance between the national and regional governments. 
The sharing of legislative and executive powers under the 1999 Constitution does not reflect this 
fundamental feature of a federal state. In the 1999 Constitution the Exclusive Legislative List contains 68 items 
all of which are exclusive to the federal government. The first 66 items refer to specific matters. The 67th item is 
any other matter with respect to which the National Assembly has powers to make laws in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. The 68th item relates to matters incidental or supplementary to any matter 
mentioned elsewhere in the list. The Concurrent Legislative List1 contains 12 items containing 30 sub-divisions. 
By the sub-divisions the list defines the respective extent of federal and state power in respect of the matters 
listed therein with the aim of reducing possible conflicts, especially through the application of the doctrine of 
covering the field. By the sub-divisions a concurrent matter no longer necessarily implies that both the federal 
and state governments are competent to act over its entire field. In respect of some matters in the list, their 
competence is respectively restricted to some aspects only of a so-called concurrent matter making such aspects 
exclusive to the one or the other. 
It is obvious that the national or federal government exercise most of the governmental powers in 
Nigeria to the detriment of the constituent states. Apart from the overwhelming dominance on the items of 
legislation, the federal government is further given power to make laws with respect to any matters incidental or 
supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in the exclusive legislative list. Furthermore, the subdivision 
of the items in the concurrent list made further items exclusive to the federal government; still the doctrine of 
covering the field operates to give further dominance to the federal government in areas where they can legislate 
concurrently with the state government. The distribution is further tilted in favour of the federal governments due 
to the frequent military incursions in the Nigerian political scene and the concentration of the national wealth in 
the federal government.  
 
The division of judicial powers under the Nigeria federalism as well provided under the Constitution2 is 
also tilted in favour of the federation. The two levels of appellate courts in the country – the Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court are both federal. The Supreme Court is not just a constitutional court; it is the highest court 
on the interpretation and application of all laws in the country, including customary laws and Sharia. To further 
compound the dominance of the judicial authority by the federal judiciary the 1999 Constitution sets up a 
National Judicial Council3 whose power extend to matters concerning both the federal and state judiciary4 and its 
membership dominated by members of the federal judiciary.5Two things are apparent on a proper analysis of the 
composition of the National Judicial Council and its terms of reference: (a) It is essentially a Federal 
Government Institution under almost total dominance of the Federal Chief Justice and (b) It is given 
responsibility to recommend appointment, discipline and dismissal not only of federal judicial officers but also 
of all state judicial officers i.e. state judges and chief judges. The National Judicial Council is also empowered to 
collect, control and disburse moneys, capital and recurrent for the judiciary.6  With the above position the 1999 
Constitution in effect established a federal judiciary for the federation and a quasi – federal judiciary for the 
states. 7  The Chief Justice of Nigeria dominates the council - apart from being the chairman, he alone is 
responsible for appointing 14 out of the 23 members, 4 of whom are members by virtue of their office including 
the Chief Justice himself. The other five members who shall be members of the Nigerian Bar Association are 
also appointed by him but on the recommendation of the National Executive Committee of the Nigerian Bar 
Association. Obviously the National Judicial Council as presently constituted is inconsistent with the federal 
status of the country. 
                                                 
1
   Part II of the Second Schedule 
2
   Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
3
  Third Schedule, Part 1 Paragraph 1 of the 1999 Constitution  
4
  Third Schedule, Part 1 Paragraph 1 (21)(a) – (1)  
5
  Third Schedule, Part 1 Paragraph 1 (20)(a) – (1) 
6
  Third Schedule, Part 1 Paragraph 1 (20)(e)  
7
  IE Sagay, “The Judiciary in a Modern Democracy” IA Ayua et al (ed.), Issues in 1999 Constitution, Lagos: Nigeria 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, (2000) p. 109 
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Admittedly the dual system of Federal and State High Courts is essential to a truly federal set up. 
However the robust enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by the 1999 Constitution1 is out of 
tune with the expected division of judicial powers in a federation. By section 251(1)2 the Federal High Court 
retains its exclusive powers in relation to the revenue of the federal government, Admiralty Matters arising from 
the Companies and Allied Matters etc. as well as all the items contained in the Exclusive Legislative List. This is 
against the previous position when the State High Courts were competent to adjudicate on matters concerning 
federal laws and bodies. The Constitution has therefore eliminated the Federal/State cooperation that had existed 
since the inception of the Federal High Court. Furthermore, section 251(1)(p)(q)(r) further preclude States’ High 
Courts from adjudicating on any matter concerning the administration and control of federal agencies, thereby 
giving the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction over 
- the administration of the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its 
agencies. 
- subject to the provisions of this Constitution the operation and interpretation of this in so far as 
it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies. 
- any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive 
or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.  
 
 The division of judicial powers between the federation and states in Nigeria is a major area of 
contention and one for further consideration in the federal system. It would be hard to find anything in the 
subject matters comprising the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court that makes them intrinsically unsuitable for 
the State High Courts to adjudicate upon. On the other hand, there is nothing intrinsic in a federal system of 
government requiring that the federating units should not have their own appellate courts. 
Autonomy carries with it some notion of equality but it is equality of status as a government. As posited 
by Nwabueze3, each government has, by virtue of its independence existence, an equal status as a government 
with the others, and so entitled to an equal say, though not necessarily equal weight, in the common councils of 
the federal state. In the nature of things the notion of equality between the national and regional governments can 
extend no further than this. The national government is necessarily bigger than a regional government in terms of 
the territorial area over which its powers are exercised. Its powers are exercised over the whole country while 
those of a regional government are confined to only part of it. Secondly, while a fair balance should be 
maintained between the powers assigned to each, they cannot be so weighted as to be equal. Matters within their 
respective competence must necessarily differ in their relative importance, and equality is not determined by 
how numerous or few are the matters assigned to it. Nor can the resources available to each be made equal. 
Federalism accommodates a certain amount of inequality in powers and resources between the national and 
regional governments, so long as any preponderance in favour of one is not such as to reduce the other relatively 
to virtual impotence.  
 
4. Equality in Powers between the Regional Governments 
Since federal relationship is between the national government on the one hand and the state governments on the 
other, and not between it and each regional government separately, the powers of the regional governments and 
their relations to the national government should be exactly the same. No regional government should have more 
or less powers than the others, or be accorded a special position in relation to the national government otherwise 
the regional governments cannot interact among themselves and with the national government as equal partners. 
The lodging of greater powers in one regional government would tend to produce in it an attitude of superiority 
and arrogance towards the others and thus destroy the equilibrium of the system. 
There should also not be a marked inequality in population between the regions. For as stated by John 
Stuart Mill:  
In all federations… some (i.e. federating regions) will be more populous, rich, and more 
civilized than others. The essential thing is, that there should not be any state so much more 
powerful (i.e. in terms of population) than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with 
many of them combined. If there be such one, and only one, it will insist on being master of 
the joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree and whenever 
they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.4  
 
                                                 
1
 From what it was under the 1979 Constitution 
2
   1999 Constitution 
3
 BO Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa, Vol. 1, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, (2003), pp. 96-97 
4
  JS Mill, Representative Government, reprinted in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative  
     Government,  Everyman’s Library (1910) pp 367 - 368 
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According to Wheare there should be “some sort of reasonable balance” between the units in area, population 
and wealth which will “insure that all units can maintain their independence within the sphere allotted to them 
and that no one can dominate the others.”1 Therefore the essence of federalism is according to James Madison to 
“control one part of the society from invading the right of another and at the same time sufficiently control itself 
from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole society.”2 In the Nigerian federation there was marked 
inequality in area and population between the federating units as it was structured before the creation of more 
states in 1967. One of the three constituent regions, the Northern region, encompassed 75 percent of the 
country’s land area and 60 percent of its population, which enabled it to dominate the national government, 
almost turning it into an extension of itself, and dictating the actions and policies to be pursued. 
 The situation is not so different under the federal structure in Nigeria today for despite the breaking up 
of the country into 36 states there is still the northern domination of the government, for almost half of the 36 
states are in the north. They therefore continue to dominate the government at the federal level.  
 
5. Financial Autonomy 
Financial autonomy is one of the immutable criteria formulated by Professor Wheare with respect to the 
existence and operation of federal government. He said financial subordination marks an end of federalism no 
matter how carefully the legal forms may be preserved.3 It is a cardinal principle of true federalism that the 
arrangement should not place such preponderance of power and financial resources in the hands of either the 
national or regional governments as to make it so powerful that it is able to bend the will of the others to its own. 
Thus in a federal state there should be available to each of the government authorities sufficient financial 
resources for the functions assigned to it under the Constitution. For if the state authorities for instance find that 
the services allotted to them are too expensive for them to perform with their limited funds, if they are to call on 
the federal authority for grants and subsidies to assist them, then they are no longer co-ordinate with the federal 
government but subordinate to it. Wheare thus argues further “… that both state and federal authorities in 
federalism must be given the power in the Constitution each to have access to and to control, its own sufficient 
financial resources. Each must have a power to tax and to borrow for the financing of its own services by itself”.4 
In line with the above Nwabueze opined thus: 
Federalism requires that the national and regional governments should stand towards each 
other in relation of meaningful autonomy and equality resting upon a balanced division of 
powers and financial resources. Each must have powers and financial resources sufficient to 
support the structure of a functioning government able to stand on its own against the other.5 
 
Without financial autonomy of the various tiers of government a country cannot rightly claim to be a true federal 
state. 
The sharing arrangement under Nigeria’s federal system assigns to the federal government powers and 
resources overwhelmingly greater than those assigned to the states, thereby depriving the states of any 
meaningful autonomy in relation to the federal government. The thirty six states structure which brought about 
the existence of units which are not economically viable being created more for political reasons, further 
weakened the financial autonomy of states. Most of the state governments are thus reduced to the status of poor 
relations of an over-powerful federal government remaining (some of them, from the time of their creation) on a 
permanent lifeline of the federal government. The situation is further compounded by the continuing influence of 
a hang-over from our military past when the state governments were mere instruments of an all-mighty federal 
military government.  
 
6. A Mechanism for Division of Powers 
For a proper functioning of federalism there should exist in a federal state a technique for division of powers 
among the different tiers of government. Generally the technique for division of powers is that of enumerated 
powers and residual powers. For any meaningful division, certain powers must be enumerated and reserved for 
the respective levels or tiers of government. The enumeration may take various forms. According to Nwabueze6 
The enumeration may be made under one list of matters exclusive to either the national or 
regional governments, or there may be two or even three lists, one for the central government 
                                                 
1
   KC Wheare, Federal Government 3rd ed. London: Oxford Press (1953) pp. 50 - 51 
2
   Quoted in T Mason, Free Government in the Making, New York: Oxford University Press, (1965) p.  
      172 
3
  KC Wheare quoted in P. Ransom (ed), Studies in Federal Planning London: Macmillan Press, (1943) pp 28-31  
4
  ibid 
5
  BO Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa Vo1.1 op.cit., p. 80 
6
   BO Nwabueze, Federalism in Nigeria under the Presidential Constitution op. cit., p. 20 
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exclusively, one exclusive to the regional governments and another concurrent to both; in 
addition certain specific matters may be assigned to either one or the other or to both 
concurrently in other provisions of the Constitution (i.e. outside the legislative lists). 
 
Nwabueze1 borrowing leaf from Watts2 further opines that:  
Having one list of matters exclusive to either the national or regional governments 
and leaving the residue to the other has the advantage of simplicity and eliminates 
the uncertainty and conflict which necessarily results from a second (i.e. concurrent) 
list; a third list inevitably adds to such uncertainty and conflict. 
 
However there are advantages of adopting the techniques of concurrent powers which may outweigh the 
disadvantages of conflict and uncertainty. In Nigeria the enumeration is into exclusive and concurrent lists. The 
exclusive list contains subject or matters for which only the federal government has the sole authority to legislate 
on for the whole country. The concurrent list contains subjects or matters on which both the federal and state 
government are empowered to make laws. The residue not listed is left for the state government to legislate on; 
however the Constitution further makes direct grants to either tier of government subjects not already 
enumerated.  
 
7. Creation of Additional Federating Units  
The Nigerian federation took off in 1954 as a federation of three units. The three states structure created so much 
instability as imperilled the continuance of the federation. The original impetus for state agitation and creation 
derived from ethnic minority opposition to the British-instituted three-region federal structure which secured 
autonomy and hegemony for the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo majority nationalities in the northern, western 
and eastern regions respectively.3 
This was compounded by the fact that one of the three units, the northern region, was bigger in size and 
population than the remaining two put together and from the majority-minority tribes structure within each 
region. Save for the rather isolated creation of the mid-west region in 1963, no significant restructuring of the 
federation was implemented throughout the over ten-year period starting from the formalisation of Nigeria’s 
federal status in 1954 up to the military overthrow of the First Republic in January 1966 – political factors 
account for this. 
Significant changes were made in 1967 by an establishment of a twelve-state framework. Further 
reorganisations were made in 1976 bringing the number of states in the federation to nineteen. Two new states 
were further created in 1987, namely Kastina in the North, and Akwa Ibom in the South by General Ibrahim 
Babangida. The continuing popular pressures for new states resulted in further creation by the Babangida regime 
of nine additional states in 1991. The 1991 reorganisation created some controversial issues such as; the location 
of five of the nine states in the North, compounding the problem of inter-regional inequality in the distribution of 
states. The new thirty states structure consisted of sixteen states in the north against only fourteen in the south. 
The minorities were similarly short-changed; they had only twelve of the thirty states. Consequently, the 
reorganisations provoked an unprecedented orgy of protests, demonstrations and arson involving tens of 
fatalities.4  
From its outset in November 1993 the Abacha government laboured under severe economic and 
political pressures. These pressures engendered contradictory perspectives and attitudes towards the issue of 
state-creation.5 However, probably due to the deluge of distributive and political pressures emanating from the 
Nigerian society, Abacha on the occasion of the country’s thirty-six independent anniversary on 1 October 1996 
announced the creation of six new states – Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Gombe, Nassarawa and Zamfara. 
The thirty six states structure provided for in the 1999 Constitution is therefore not immutable as it is 
itself a product of change having evolved from its original structure of three regions. The increase in the 
constituent units is predicated on the need to create a balanced federation and protection for minorities in the 
traditional sense of tribal minorities, as well as for greater territorial diffusion of economic and political power 
and to bring government nearer to the people and thereby instil in them greater responsibility for the success of 
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government, and for development at a quickened pace. Despite the above considerations which still remain valid 
and relevant today there is need for constitutional restriction on the creation of more states to ensure that no new 
state is to be created which cannot effectively sustain the apparatus and powers of a state government in a 
federation characterised by equality between its component units and further that the economic costs of running 
additional state governments would not impair the overall developmental capacity of the federation.  
In the light of the above: that is, the need for increase in constituent units as well as the need for 
restriction on creation of more states, there is need for a proper balance of these interests in giving provisions as 
well as restrictions on the creation of states in a federal Constitution. Under the present Nigerian federal 
Constitution is there a proper balance of these two conflicting interests? Section 8(1)1 provides that: 
An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of creating a new state shall only be passed 
if-: 
(a) a request, supported by at least two-thirds majority of members (representing the area 
demanding the creation of the new state in each of the following, namely -  
  (i) the Senate and House of Representatives, 
  (ii) the House of Assembly in respect of the area, and  
(iii) the local government councils in respect of the area, is received by the National 
Assembly; 
(b) a proposal for the creation of the state is thereafter approved in a referendum by at least 
two-thirds majority of the people of the area where the demand for creation of the state 
originated; 
(c) the result of the referendum is then approved by a simple majority of all the states of 
the federation supported by a simple majority of members of the Houses of 
Assembly; and  
(d) the proposal is approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of members of 
each House of the National Assembly. 
 
The above provision is tedious, rigid and raises several questions of interpretation. If the provision is interpreted 
in the order it is given it would mean: - the National Assembly must receive a request supported by two-thirds 
majority of members representing the area demanding the new states in each of the following; the senate, the 
house of representatives, the state house of assembly in respect of the area and the local government councils in 
respect of the area. After this, the proposal for the creation of the state is put to a referendum in the area 
concerned and approved by at least two-thirds majority of the people of that area. The question raised here is 
whether the provision “two-thirds majority of the people of the area where the demand for creation of the state 
originated” means two-thirds of those who voted, two-thirds of the registered voters or two-thirds of the whole 
population of the area. If the proposal survives up to this stage it is then put before the thirty six states houses of 
assembly and for it to survive it must be approved by a simple majority of the states. The proposal must then be 
approved by a resolution passed by at least two-thirds majority of each house of the National Assembly.  
The interpretation questions and other difficulties involved in the creation of states seem to make it 
almost impossible for any creation of states under the constitutional provision. Thus it has been argued that ‘the 
protracted and obstacle-laden process prescribed by this subjection for the creation of new states seem 
deliberately intended to ensure that new states can only be created under military regimes but never under civil 
democratic government.2 Furthermore according to the learned writer the result of these daunting provisions is to 
effectively suppress the right of self-determination of communities seeking statehood, thereby tying them 
unwillingly to other communities with whom they are not compatible. The autonomy and self-government 
associated with federalism are thus stifled, giving rise to resentment and conflicts.3  
Obviously there is need for a more positive procedure that will accommodate more genuine demands 
for state creation as the entrenchment in the Constitution of near impossible conditions and the resulting feeling 
that the door had thereby been permanently closed to further states creation might induce resort to extra-
constitutional means. While it is true that the procedure for state creation should not be such as to enable every 
village, town or clan to become a state, the conditions should be such that the number of states in the country 
should be amendable to adjustments as the needs and circumstances of the country dictates. This is so, as 
federalism thrives where a multiplicity of interest groups operate and react on each other producing stability in 
the polity.  
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8. The Structure of Many Autonomous Governments but a Single Constitution 
The Nigerian federation is made up of thirty seven autonomous governments – a general government exercising 
power throughout the country on certain enumerated matters and thirty six other governments localised in 
geographical divisions known as states and with jurisdiction in matters not assigned exclusively to the general 
government. A government presupposes or rather implies a constitution by which it is organised and its powers 
defined.  
It is a contradiction for a government whether in a federal or unitary system, to be without a 
constitution. The very notion of government necessarily implies a constitution and the notion of a constitution 
from its origin did not exist as something apart and separate from government; it was coeval and entirely integral 
with, not external or anterior to, government.1 A constitution as a deliberate creation in written form existing 
separately from government, something external and anterior to government, and from which government 
derives its existence, is entirely the invention of the American revolutionaries in the 18th century. Wheare puts it 
thus;  
Until the time of the American and French Revolutions, a selection or collection of 
fundamental principles was not usually called “the constitution”… Since that time the practice 
of having a written document containing the principles of government organisation has 
become well-established and “constitution” has come to have this meaning.2  
 
Though a Constitution in its modern sense as something separate from, and anterior to, government, has acquired 
other functions, viz the guarantee of the freedom of the individual against the government and the declaration of 
the fundamental objectives of the nation, its primary function remains that of an act by which a state or 
government is constituted. 
Even in its modern sense as something external and anterior to government, a unitary constitution for a 
federal system of government remains a contradiction in ideas. A federal system, being an arrangement between 
separate, autonomous governments, it follows that under federalism separate national and regional governments 
should strictly imply separate constitutions for each government. A single constitution for all the governments 
both federal and state is a manifest contradiction. 
This is implicit in the definition of federalism by the judicial committee of the Privy Council thus “the 
natural and literal interpretation of the word (i.e. federal), confines its application to cases in which these states, 
while agreeing on a measure of delegation, yet in the main continue to preserve their original Constitutions.3 In 
the older federations for example the United States of America and Australia, states existing under their own 
separate Constitutions formed themselves into a federal union under a new national government established by a 
separate Constitution whilst continuing to exist and function as regional governments with their old 
Constitutions, modified as may be necessary. In essence, the regional governments and their Constitutions pre-
date the federal union, and continue to exist after its formation. Federalism is also applied in another sense, 
which though may be regarded as loose application of the system, is equally predicated upon the separateness 
and independence of the Constitutions of the federating governments. This occurs when the federating units 
surrender their original Constitutions and accept new ones, as in the case of Canada – where according to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, “self-contained states agree to delegate their powers to a common 
government with a view to entirely new Constitutions even of the states themselves.4  
Nigeria however departed from this principle of true federalism, and uses one single Constitution to 
establish and organise the federal and state governments. The federation of Nigeria differs in its origin from the 
other federations in the United States, Australia and Canada, as it was formed by a state hitherto under a unitary 
government, devolving part of its powers to three autonomous regional governments. The uniqueness of this 
application of the federal concept was pointed out by the drafting committee on the review of the Nigerian 
Constitution in 1951 thus:  
The federal governments of USA, Canada and Australia have been built on the basis of 
separate states surrendering to a federal government some of their powers for the benefit of all. 
The reverse process on which we are engaged – that of the creation of a federal government by 
devolution – is a political experiment for which… there is no precedent to guide us and we are 
very conscious of the dangers involved in such an experiment.5   
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Thus at the inception of the Nigerian federation by devolution from an existing unitary state, the federal 
and regional governments were organised and powers and resources shared among them by one common 
Constitution with no differentiation of any kind. Under that Constitution, the same sections established the 
organs of both the federal and regional governments and defined their powers.  
Under the 1960 independence Constitution, separate Constitutions were established for the federal and 
for each of the regional governments in separate schedules annexed to the Independence Order-in-Council. This 
was also the position under the 1963 Nigerian Republican Constitution. The Nigerian Constitutions of 1979 and 
1999 reverted to the form under that of 1951 and 1954 with the federal and state governments being governed by 
one, single constitutional instrument. Under these Constitutions provisions relating to the federal and state 
governments are segregated in separate parts of the same chapters, while miscellaneous and transitional 
provisions common to both tiers of government are dealt with together in the same sections, such provisions as 
those on division of powers, fundamental objectives and directive principles, citizenship and fundamental rights. 
The form of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions i.e. the unitary character may not be unconnected with the fact that 
they do not owe their origin as an act of the people as a Constitution is supposed to be. For according to its 
famous definition by one of the 18th century American revolutionists, Thomas Paine, in his Rights of Man “a 
Constitution is not the act of government, but of a people constituting a government”. Both Constitutions were 
made by the Federal Military Government, a government of absolute power, by virtue of sovereignty seized by 
force or threat of it from the Nigerian people. Therefore, the civilian governments, both federal and state, 
installed since 29 May, 1999 derive their existence and authority as a government from the military. 
 
9. Supremacy of the Constitution 
One of the fundamental features of a federal arrangement is the need for a supreme constitution which binds all 
persons, government and authorities. In any federal state, the constitution being the source of life and powers of 
both the central authority and the federating units must be supreme.  In the words of Nwabueze  
The independence of each tier of government in a federation implies that the terms of the 
arrangement especially as concern the division of powers, must be embodied in a constitution 
that is supreme over both the general and regional governments, and overrides any act done by 
either of them in violation of those terms, a constitution that binds or obliges the general and 
regional governments to keep within the terms of the arrangement, and which operates to 
invalidate any transgression of the limit imposed on the powers of each government. The 
independence of each tier of government as respects its existence, powers, rights and personnel 
is a matter which the other is not at liberty to respect or not as it likes.1  
 
Quoting Wheare, he further stated that; “If the general and regional governments are to be co-ordinate with each 
other, neither must be in a position to override the terms of their agreement about the powers and status which 
each is to enjoy. So far as this agreement regulates their relations with each other, it must be supreme.”2 The 
constitution which is supreme over both the central government and the federating units overrides any act carried 
out by either of the governments in violation of the terms contained in the constitution. Most federal 
constitutions in line with this contain provisions to the effect that any law, whether made by the centre or the 
constituent units, which provisions contravene or is inconsistent with the provisions or stipulations of the 
constitution is ultra vires, null and void to the extent of its inconsistency with the constitution. The supremacy of 
the constitution is explicitly provided for in the 1999 Constitution thus “This Constitution is supreme and its 
provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria”;3 
“The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of 
the government of Nigeria or any part thereof except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution;4 “If 
any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution this Constitution shall prevail and that other 
law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void”5 
In line with the constitutional provision the Nigerian courts have upheld the supremacy of the 
Constitution in a plethora of cases.6 In Ansa & Ors. v. The Registered Trustees of the Presbyterian Church of 
Nigeria v. Central Bank of Nig. & Others7 the Court of Appeal stated that ‘by virtue of section 1(1) of the 1999 
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Constitution, the Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and 
persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It supersedes any law or statute or enactment. It is the 
grundnorm, the organic and fundamental law of the land. All other legislations in the land take their hierarchy 
from the provisions of the Constitution. And by virtue of section 1(3) of the Constitution if any other law or 
statute is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law or 
statute shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void…”1 
However, it is argued that the Constitution must not only be declared to but must be seen to be supreme. 
There is need to consolidate on and strengthen the Supremacy Clause as contained in the Constitution by 
conferring on every Nigerian the express right to go to challenge constitutional breaches in court. Also in 
addition to the provision of Section 1(2) which prohibits unconstitutional take-over of government, there should 
be a provision for sanctions for unconstitutional take-over of government. It shall be the inalterable and 
unavoidable right of the people to punish violators of the constitutional order, and necessity shall not be a 
defence.2 
 
10. Conclusion and Way Forward 
The Nigerian federalism obviously falls short of the basic features of a true federal state. This may among other 
reasons be as a result of the manner in which the Nigerian federation was formed which differs from the manner 
of formation of other notable federal states like the United States of America, Canada and Australia. The 
constant military incursion into the government of Nigeria since the formation of the Nigerian federation is 
another reason why there are several features of unitary government structures in the Nigerian federation. Even 
under democratic government in Nigeria, especially when the mantle of power is in the hands of former military 
dictators turned democratic president, a lot of governmental practices tend towards practices under military 
government and so contradicts and stultifies the practice of federalism in the country. 
 For a proper functioning of the Nigerian federalism, there is need for a proper restructuring of the 
federal structure in Nigeria starting from a constitutional amendment that will inculcate the basic requirements of 
federalism. There should be a proper balance in the sharing of governmental powers, functions and allocation of 
resources between the federal government and the governments of the federating units to ensure that each of the 
government of the 36 states of Nigeria is equipped with every paraphernalia of government to be able to stand as 
an independent autonomous entity as is required for the practice of federalism. Nigeria may also have to borrow 
leaf from the practices in operation in countries acclaimed as practicing true federalism, such as having separate 
constitutions for the federal government and the governments of the various 36 states of the federation, 
upholding the provision for the supremacy of constitution in governmental practices, observing the federal 
character principle as enshrined in section 14 (3) of the 1999 Constitution in making federal appointments to 
ensure that the various states of the federation have equal representation in the government at the federal level so 
as to avoid the domination of any state or some states in the affairs of government. 
 It is hoped that the extant government of Nigeria will proceed with the constitutional amendment 
process initiated by the out gone government of President Goodluck Jonathan and through that correct some of 
the anomalies in the Nigerian federal structure. 
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